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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Appellant Dawn Humphrey (hereinafter Ms. Humphrey and/or Appellant) 
appeals from convictions following a jury trial for the offenses of aiding and abetting 
burglary and aiding and abetting petit theft 
Ms. Humphrey challenges the introduction of I.R.E. 404(b) (hereinafter 404(b)) 
evidence of other bad acts. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On January 7, 2010, Ms. Humphrey and her co-defendant Larry White entered 
an antique store called "The Price Tag" in Wallace, ldaho.1 (R. p. 88.) Mr. White 
walked to the back of the store, and Ms. Humphrey started talking to Marcina Fogel, an 
employee who was located at the front of the store. (R. p. 88.) Ms. Humphrey began 
discussing a tea pot she had brought with her and tried to sell it to Ms. Fogel (who did 
not have the authority to buy it). (R. p. 88.) 
Mr. White then emerged from the back of the store and left immediately without 
speaking to the store employees. (R. p. 89.) Ms. Humphrey left with him and they 
walked quickly to their vehicle. (R. p. 89.) An employee noticed something furry under 
Mr. White's jacket and he had his arm pressed against his jacket as though concealing 
some object. (R. p. 89.) Ms. Fogel checked the antique clothing section at the back of 
1 Appellant is here summarizing the facts as explained in the state's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motions to Dismiss and Suppress which is based on the 
preliminary hearing testimony, but the evidence at trial was substantially the same. 
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the store and discovered that a mannequin was bare and a fur stole was missing. (R. p. 
89.) 
The police were called and a short time later found the missing fur stole in the 
defendants' vehicle. (R. p. 89.) 
At trial, co-defendant Larry White, who had apparently already pied guilty, 
testified on behalf of Mr. Humphrey. He said that their purpose of going to The Price 
Tag was to get an assessment of the teapot and was not to steal anything. (Tr. p. 281-
282.) They did not discuss stealing anything from The Price Tag and he didn't want to 
steal anything when they went in, especially since Ms. Humphrey was very mad at 
him for stealing the teapot in the first place (more on this below). (Tr. p. 282.) Mr. 
Smith testified when he saw the mink stole, he just thought that she would like to have 
it and if he got it for her she wouldn't be angry at him for taking the teapot. (Tr. p. 283-
284.) He also explained that he had suffered four strokes and receives social security 
and was overmedicating that day. (Tr. p. 284-285.) 
Procedurally, Ms. Humphrey was charged by criminal complaint with aiding and 
abetting burglary and aiding and abetting petit theft. (R. p. 7.) After a preliminary 
hearing, Ms. Humphrey was bound over to the district court and an information was filed 
containing the same charges (R. p. 22, 26-27.) 
The matter proceeded to trial where a jury found her guilty as charged. (R. p. 
167.) The court sentenced Ms. Humphrey to 4 years with the first 1 ½ years fixed and 
retained jurisdiction. (R. p. 218.) 
Appellant timely appeals. (R. p. 223.) 
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ISSUE 





THE COURT ERRED BY ADMITTING THE 404(b) EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES 
A. Standard of review. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals explained the standard of review for this issue in 
State v. Naranjo, 267 P.3d 721 (Ct.App. 2011 ): 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove a 
defendant's criminal propensity. I.R.E. 404(b); However, such evidence 
may be admissible for a purpose other than that prohibited by 1.R.E. 
404(b). In determining the admissibility of evidence of prior bad acts, the 
Idaho Supreme Court has utilized a two-tiered analysis. The first tier 
involves a two-part inquiry: (1) whether there is sufficient evidence to 
establish the prior bad acts as fact; and (2) whether the prior bad acts are 
relevant to a material disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other 
than propensity. Such evidence is relevant only if the jury can reasonably 
conclude the act occurred and the defendant was the actor. Id. We will 
treat the trial court's factual determination that a prior bad act has been 
established by sufficient evidence as we do all factual findings by a trial 
court. We defer to a trial court's factual findings if supported by substantial 
and competent evidence in the record. Whether evidence is relevant is an 
issue of law. Therefore, when considering admission of evidence of prior 
bad acts, we free review of the trial court's relevancy determination. 
The second tier in the analysis is the determination of whether the 
probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by unfair 
prejudice. When reviewing this tier we use an abuse of discretion 
standard. Id. When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on 
appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) 
whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; 
(2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion 
and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific 
choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by 
an exercise of reason. 
Id. at p. 725-726 (internal citations omitted). 
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B. The 404(b) evidence. 
The state filed a Motion in Limine giving its notice of intent to introduce to elicit 
404(b) evidence at trial. (R. p. 119.) The motion explained that employees of Wiggets 
Antique Market Place in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, will testify that Ms. Humphrey and Mr. 
White entered their store together on January 5, 2010 (two days before the instant 
crime. (R. p. 119.) The employees will testify that Mr. Humphrey brought in an antique 
plate and offered it for sale (and it was purchased from her). (R. p. 119.) Mr. White 
proceeded into the interior of the store and then left the store and Ms. Humphrey left the 
store a short time later. (R. p. 120.) The employees will testify that after the defendants 
left they noticed that an antique teapot was missing. (R. p. 120.) 
The motion continued by explaining that employees from "The Price Tag" will 
testify that it was the same teapot offered for sale two days later and that the police 
officer will testify he recovered the teapot from the defendants' vehicle. (R. p. 120.) Also, 
the state explained it will offer certified judgments showing that the defendant pied guilty 
to petit theft regarding the teapot from Wiggets in a Kootenai County case. (R. p. 120.) 
An evidentiary hearing on the 404(b) motion was held. Defense counsel, who 
had just entered the case, requested the court not make a final ruling until he had a 
chance to contest the matter with his own affidavits and witnesses. (Tr. p. 73.) The 
court agreed to wait and allow the defense to present evidence at a later pre-trial 
conference. (Tr. p. 74.) 
At that later pre-trial conference, defense counsel stated he was not resisting the 
404(b). Since the court then made a comprehensive ruling admitting the evidence, it 
appears defense counsel meant that he was not actively resisting the motion by 
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presenting argument or evidence, as opposed to agreeing to allow the 404(b) evidence 
in.2 
The court ruled as follows: 
And having considered it, I am going to allow the State to present the 
evidence that it has given notice of pursuant to Rule 404(b). I think that 
that evidence is relevant to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
knowledge, identity and absence of mistake or accident, in addition to, to 
the extent it might not be incorporated within those lists of items, a modus 
operandi. So the State will be allowed to present that evidence. 
And I've certainly considered that-weighed the potential prejudice to the 
defendants in making that ruling, as I'm required to under Rule 403, and I 
think the relevance of the proposed testimony by far outweighs the 
potential prejudice to the defense. So I am going to allow the state to 
present that evidence. 
Tr. 113, In. 21-p. 114, In. 11. 
C. The court erred by admitting the 404(b) evidence. 
Appellant asserts that the court erred in allowing into evidence, the 404(b) 
evidence regarding the theft of the teapot from Wiggets. Appellant takes no issue with 
the first part of the first tier of the inquiry, to wit, whether there was sufficient evidence 
that the other bad act actually happened. Nor is Appellant arguing that the court could 
not have found the evidence was relevant for some non-propensity purpose. 
Rather, Appellant asserts that the problem is that the jury would not have 
considered the evidence for any reason other than propensity, regardless of whether 
the court could find a non-propensity related reason for its admission. Therefore, the 
2 Defense counsel's odd phrasing again came up in trial when the court had to clarify 
what he was not resisting. (Tr. p. 256-257.) But Appellant asserts that regardless of 
what defense counsel meant, the 404(b) issue is reviewable as preserved error since 
the court made a ruling, which is the very point of the requirement that error be 
preserved. 
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court erred by declaring that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially 
outweighed by the unfair prejudice. 
Obviously, the prior bad act evidence was propensity evidence even if it also 
had non-propensity relevance. Prior to the instant offense, the two defendants went 
into a store where according to the state's theory, Ms. Humphrey distracted the 
storekeeper by trying to sell an item while Mr. White stole something. In the instant 
case, the two defendants went into a store where according to the state's theory, Ms. 
Humphrey distracted the storekeeper by trying to sell an item while Mr. White stole 
something. To make matters far worse, the earlier stolen teapot was the item Mr. 
Humphrey was trying to sell. 
It strains credulity to believe that the jury would or could have parsed out the 
different usages of the prior bad act evidence and considered it for only a proper 
purpose but not for an improper purpose. In other words, Appellant asserts that it 
cannot be seriously argued that the jury did not use the prior bad act evidence as 
propensity evidence, to wit, they did it before and so they did it again. 
The danger of this sort of propensity evidence was explained in State v. Grist, 
147 Idaho 49 (2009): 
The policy underlying the common law rule [prohibiting character 
evidence] was the protection of the criminal defendant. See WRIGHT & 
GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE, § 
5239, pp. 436-439. "The prejudicial effect of [character evidence] is that it 
induces the jury to believe the accused is more likely to have committed 
the crime on trial because he is a man of criminal character." State v. 
Wrenn, 99 Idaho 506, 510, 584 P.2d 1231, 1235 (1978). Character 
evidence, therefore, takes the jury away from their primary consideration 
of the guilt or innocence of the particular crime on trial. Id. 
Id., at p. 52. 
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In this case, the prior bad act is the exactly the same crime as the instant 
offense. Thus, there is an extreme likelihood that once the jury learned they had done 
it before, that it would find them guilty without serious consideration of whether they did 
it again. In other words, it would take away the jury's primary consideration of the guilt 
or innocence of the instant offense. 
Additionally, while the standard other bad acts instruction was given in this 
case, Appellant asserts that it was insufficient to prevent the prior bad act evidence from 
being used as propensity evidence. (R. p. 188.) In State v. Stoddard, 105 Idaho 533, 
538 (Ct.App. 1983), the Court of Appeals explained that in a case involving the theft of 
one expensive sports car, the prejudice of introducing evidence of charges concerning 
the defendant's theft of a different expensive sports car was so great that the error could 
not have been cured by an instruction. In our case, it again cannot be seriously argued, 
excerpt by resort to legal fiction, that any instruction would prevent the jury from using 
the evidence in the way it would be used by anyone under any circumstance. 
Appellant asserts that district court here did not come to its conclusion that the 
probative value was not substantially outweighed by the unfair prejudice by an exercise 
of reason. This is because it did not consider the power of propensity evidence and the 
extreme unlikelihood that the jury would consider it in any other way. 
Finally, this is a preserved issue, an objection having been made below and the 
district court having ruled on the issue. In State v. Perry, 245 P.3d 961 (Idaho 2010), 
the Idaho Supreme Court explained: 
Idaho shall from this point forward employ the Chapman harmless error 
test to all objected-to error. A defendant appealing from an objected-to, 
non-constitutionally-based error shall have the duty to establish that such 
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an error occurred, at which point the State shall have the burden of 
demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Id., 974. 
Accordingly, unless the State meets its burden, the convictions must be 
reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Humphrey requests this reverse and vacate her convictions for aiding and 
abetting burglary and aiding and abetting petit theft. 
~ 
DATED thi0 I day of March, 2012. 
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